In a previous post, I mentioned a partial resolution to Penrose’s challenge to Popper’s falsifiability. But in footnote 3 I mentioned that there was still…
Popper’s demarcation criterion is widely understood as an attempt to find the boundary between science and pseudo-science. But in his paper “Addressing Three Popular Philosophic…
In my posts on the problems of refutation, I’ve claimed that within a theory-to-theory comparison refutations and verifications/support are symmetrical. I showed that Popper actually…
For many years I was bothered by the idea that there was no such thing as verification or support in science. In this post, I…
In my last post, I went over Popper’s own argument for why an asymmetry between refutation and verification exists. To summarize Popper’s view: Universal statements…
In my last post, I discussed various problems (or rather pseudo-problems) with Popper’s epistemology around his concept of refutation/falsification. (For our purposes, we will treat…
Though I’ve always agreed with Popper-Deutsch epistemology conceptually, I’ve always been bothered by some aspects of how it seemed to handled refutations. Particularly, I’ve struggled…
In the next few posts, I’m going to address what I call the ‘problem of refutation.’ I’ve hinted at this problem in past posts, particularly…
In episode 39, Richard Byrne has spent his whole career trying to determine when animals learned to ‘think.’ We discuss Richard Byrne’s methodology for determining…
I previously wrote about how the rational fallacies differ from the logical fallacies and how rational fallacies are far more important and more common than…